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We have no preconceived notions of whether any particular type
of diversification, including the holding-company approach, is
either good or bad. Our intention is ... to prevent a reoccurrence
of the Penn Central bankruptcy in the field of aviation.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1969 reorganization of United Air Lines' initiated a period
of airline interest in diversified business activity that may ultimately
eclipse the airlines' enchantment with mergers as a panacea for
financial difficulties.' United's lead was quickly followed by two
cargo carriers, Flying Tiger Line" and Airlift International.' Two
years later, when Braniff Airways filed its application' with the
Civil Aeronautics Board for approval of a plan of reorganization,
however, the CAB's response was an order7 instituting a full-scale
investigation of air carrier diversification. This investigation was
precipitated by two events that had occurred during the interval
1 Statement of Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman Robert D. Timm Before
the Subcomm. for Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies of the House
Committee on Appropriations, April 17, 1973 (emphasis added).
'See CAB Order No. 69-4-67 (April 15, 1969); CAB Order No. 69-7-172
(July 31, 1969).
On the extent, success and regulation of airline mergers, see Keyes, Notes
on the History of Federal Regulation of Airline Mergers, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM.
357 (1971); Crooker, Airline Mergers in the 1970's, 39 J. Am L. & CoM. 143
(1973); Reid & Mohrfeld, Airline Size, Profitability, Mergers and Regulation,
39 J. AIR L. & COM. 167 (1973).
4 See CAB Order No. 69-12-121 (Dec. 29, 1969); CAB Order No. 70-6-119
(May 5, 1970).
5 See CAB Order No. 70-6-120 (June 19, 1970); CAB Order No. 70-9-8 (July
15, 1970).
'CAB Docket No. 24048 (filed Dec. 8, 1971).
7 CAB Order No. 72-3-27 (March 10, 1972).
' Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation, CAB Docket Nos. 21508, 21223,
24048, and 24283 [hereinafter cited in text as "Reorganization Investigation"].
The investigation was instituted by CAB Order No. 72-3-27 (March 10, 1972).
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between the United reorganization and the Braniff application.
First, the Penn Central bankruptcy' had raised questions about
the stability of highly diversified corporate conglomerates and the
desirability of these corporate forms in regulated transportation
industries. Although the collapse of the Penn Central rail system
was not demonstrably caused by diversification alone, there was
a clear possibility that complex corporate structures like that of
the Penn Central might conceal financial maneuvering that stripped
a regulated carrier of its resources and rendered it incapable of
fulfilling its function of providing adequate transportation. The
Interstate Commerce Commission had expressed misgivings about
"the growing influence over regulated carriers by conglomerates
having little or no concern for the public interest in transporta-
tion,. 1 and the CAB recognized that this influence might extend
to air as well as surface carriers. Secondly, a 1969 amendment'
to the Federal Aviation Act of 195812 broadened CAB power to
regulate acquisition of control of air carriers. These two events led
the CAB to question the wisdom of permitting unhindered diversi-
fication on the one hand, and to place strict conditions on its
approval of air carrier reorganizations on the other. 3
In the Reorganization Investigation," airline predictions that
diversification would result in improved fiscal health for the car-
riers, through better utilization of management talent and "dam-
pening" of cyclical earnings patterns," were subjected to close
scrutiny. Administrative Law Judge E. Robert Seaver concluded
9 In re Penn Central Transp. Co., Civil No. 70-347 (E.D.Pa.) (filed June 21,
1970).
"0 See CAB Order No. 72-3-27, at 4 (March 10, 1972); ci. ICC, DIVERSIFICA-
TION AND CONGLOMERATES (1971) (pamphlet) reproduced in Initial Decision of
Administrative Law Judge, Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation, CAB Docket
24283 et al., Appendix G (served Aug. 27, 1973).
"Pub. L. No. 91-62, 83 Stat. 103 (Aug. 20, 1969), 49 U.S.C. § 1377, 1378
(Supp. V., 1969), amending 49 U.S.C. SS 1377, 1378 (1964) [codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1377, 1378 (1970)].
12 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. S 1301
et seq. (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973
[hereinafter sometimes cited in text as "the Act"].
"
3 See CAB Order No. 70-9-8 (July 15, 1970); CAB Order No. 71-6-106
(June 21, 1971); CAB Order No. 72-3-27 (March 10, 1972).
14 CAB Docket No. 24283 (filed March 10, 1972).
'" Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge E. Robert Seaver, Air Carrier
Reorganization Investigation, CAB Docket No. 24283 et al., at 5, 15 (served
Aug. 23, 1973). [hereinafter cited as Initial Decision].
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that reorganization and diversification were not necessarily incon-
sistent with the public interest. 6 He recommended, however, that
a system of rules be prescribed for the regulation of these re-
organizations finding that, without this regulation, serious abuses
"would occur or they would be so likely to occur that such diversifi-
cation . . would have to be prohibited."'" Judge Seaver's recom-
mended "transaction agreements" raise compelling questions that
must be carefully analyzed both in the context of the basic posi-
tions of the parties to the Reorganization Investigation and the
scope of CAB regulatory power over the economic activities of
air carriers. For example, assuming that the Board's regulatory
power is essentially unlimited, might not the exercise of this power
result in substitution of CAB judgment for that of airline man-
agement? Furthermore, is there a danger that the benefits of
diversification will be denied to carriers who prefer to abandon"
their reorganization plans rather than proceed encumbered by a
morass of strict and burdensome controls on virtually every aspect
of corporate financial activity?
II. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD POWER OVER
AIR CARRIER CONTROL
The basic grant of statutory authority for Civil Aeronautics
Board control of the corporate relationships of air carriers is
found in Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958." That
"6 Initial Decision at 218.
7 Id.
"1 After the CAB made its approval of the reorganization of Airlift Interna-
tional, Inc., subject to "fairly strict conditions," Airlift, for unspecified reasons,
abandoned its reorganization plans and was dismissed as a party to the Re-
organization Investigation. Initial Decision at 2; see CAB Order No. 70-9-8 (July
15, 1970); CAB Order No. 72-5-51 (May 12, 1972).
1" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 408, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970),
provides in pertinent part: Sec. 408(a) It shall be unlawful, unless approved by
order of the Board as provided in this section:
(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any
other common carrier, any person engaged in any other phase of
aeronautics, or any other person to acquire control of any air carrier
in any manner whatsoever. ...
Sec. 408(d) Whenever, after the effective date of this section, a person,
not an air carrier, is authorized, pursuant to this section, to acquire
control of an air carrier, such person thereafter shall, to the extent
found by the Board to be reasonably necessary for the administra-
tion of this Act, be subject, in the same manner as if such person
were an air carrier, to the .provisions of this Act relating to accounts,
1974]
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section, recently expanded by a 1969 amendment," provides, inter
alia, that it shall be unlawful for any person whatsoever to acquire
control of an air carrier without CAB approval."1 Additionally,
subsection 408 (f) creates a presumption of control by any person
beneficially owning ten percent or more of the combined voting
stock (or its equivalent) of an air carrier.' The section thus gives
the CAB extensive regulatory power over acquisitions of air car-
riers by unrelated parties. The CAB also considers that section
408 (a) (5) gives the Board control over acquisitions "from with-
in,"" as in the reorganizations to date, in which an air carrier itself
creates a holding company that "acquires" the carrier.
A close examination of section 408, however, reveals some
troublesome features of that section as currently interpreted by
the CAB. First, while the section prohibits acquisition of an air
carrier by "any other person" without CAB approval, there is no
mention of acquisition of "any other person" by an air carrier.
Public Law 91-62,' signed by President Nixon on August 20,
1969, supposedly closed a "loophole"' by adding the words "or
any other person" to section 408 (a) (5). This amendment un-
doubtedly had the effect of broadening the scope of CAB regula-
tory power:
records, and reports, and the inspection of facilities and records,
including the penalties applicable in the case of violations thereof.
Sec. 408(f) For the purposes of this section, any person owning bene-
ficially 10 per centum or more of the voting securities or capital,
as the case may be, of an air carrier shall be presumed to be in con-
trol of such air carrier unless the Board finds otherwise. As used
herein, beneficial ownership of 10 per centum of the voting securities
of a carrier means ownership of such amount of its outstanding
voting securities as entitles the holder thereof to cast 10 per centurn
of the aggregate votes which the holders of all the outstanding
voting securities of such carrier are entitled to cast. [emphasis added
to portions inserted by Pub. L. No. 91-62, 83 Stat. 103 (Aug. 20,
1969)].
20See note 11 supra.
2149 U.S.C. 5 1378(a)(5) (1970).
-49 U.S.C. § 1378(f) (1970).
"3 Initial Decision at 150-51.
2 4 Pub. L. No. 91-62, 83 Stat. 103 (Aug. 20, 1969), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1377, 1378
(Supp. V., 1969), amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1377, 1378 (1964) [codified at 49
U.S.C. SS 1377, 1378 (1970)].
' See Hearings on H.R. 8261, 8322, 8323 Before the Subcomm. on Transp.
and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1969); Hearings on S.1373 Before the Senate Comm. on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (1969).
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Although described as merely "closing a loophole," these changes
do substantially more. Prior to Public Law 91-62, the statute did
not conceive of air transportation as an exception to the ordinary
right of persons to engage in lawful businesses of their own choos-
ing. Only in the case of control by related businesses or other car-
riers, when anticompetitive activities might threaten the [Federal
Aviation] Act's broad developmental objectives, did Congress assert
a regulatory interest. The new language makes the exception into
the rule. No one is free to acquire control of an air carrier without
the scrutiny of the CAB. In addition, under a broad "public inter-
est" test, the Board may assert the power to determine what types
of people will be allowed to control airlines, and to examine what-
ever factors, including business ability, character, motives, and per-
sonal habits, it deems pertinent."
Although this grant of power to the CAB may have closed one
loophole, another gap, at least as large, remains. Since there is
no mention in section 408 (or elsewhere) of acquisition of "any
other person" by an air carrier, there is no express statutory re-
striction on diversification of air carriers by direct acquisition or
creation of non-air carrier subsidiaries." Presumably, therefore,
CAB regulation of these transactions is limited to indirect control
through the Board's other regulatory powers over the parent air-
line.' The only conceivable escape from this limitation would be
to give section 408 (a) (5) a "bilateral" reading with respect to
the words "any other person" so as to extend the force of the
section by implication to cover acquisitions of subsidiaries by air
carriers as well as acquisitions of air carriers by other parties.'
The CAB has not interpreted the statute in this way,' but Admin-
20Rasenberger, Control of an Air Carrier by "Any Other Person"-Flying
Blind Under the Federal Aviation Act, 37 J. Ani L. & COM. 65, 68-69 (1971)(emphasis in original). Mr. Rasenberger's article is an extremely cogent analysis
of CAB regulatory power under section 408 as originally enacted and as amended
by Public Law 91-62. A good discussion of the history of section 408 as originally
enacted in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is found in Allen, Section 408 of the
Federal Aviation Act: A Study in Agency Law-Making, 45 VA. L. REV. 1073
(1959).
27 This would, of course, be strictly true only of subsidiaries not "engaged
in any phase of aeronautics." Section 408(a)(6) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. S
1378(a)(6) (1970), makes it unlawful, unless approved by the Board:(6) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to
acquire control, in any manner whatsoever, of any person engaged
in any phase of aeronautics otherwise than as an air carrier . ...
28 Cf. Initial Decision at 154-55.
Id. n.27.
"Id. The CAB has, however, given such a "bilateral" construction to the lan-
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istrative Law Judge Seaver recommended, in his Initial Decision
in the Reorganization Investigation, that Congress enact legisla-
tion giving the CAB this power."'
A second flaw in section 408 is the presumption created by
subsection (f)" that a ten per cent ownership of voting stock con-
stitutes control for the purposes of section 408 (a) (5). Since the
CAB thereby obtains considerable powers' over persons acquiring
a relatively small interest in an air carrier, even though other per-
sons already hold much larger interests, it is entirely possible that
potential investors will decline to invest this heavily in air carrier
securities. Ironically, this provision can be viewed as encouraging
the holding-company form of reorganization. For example, UAL,
Inc., which owns all the stock of United Air Lines, Inc., is the
only "person" in "control" of United. The owners of UAL are
thereby insulated from CAB regulation through the use of the
holding-company device. "
Another provision of the Federal Aviation Act having great
potential effect on air carrier diversification is section 414,' which
guage concerning common carrier acquisition of control of an air carrier, inter-
preting the policy behind section 408(a)(5) to apply equally to air carrier acqui-
sition of control of another common carrier. See, e.g., Freight Forwarder Case,
9 C.A.B. 473 (1948); Initial Decision at 154-55 n.28. See also Rasenberger, supra
note 26, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. at 81-2.
"Initial Decision at 180-81. Judge Seaver's recommendation is the deletion
of the phrase "engaged in any other phase of aeronautics" from section 408(a) (1)
of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(1) (1970) which makes it unlawful, unless ap-
proved by the Board:
(1) For two or more air carriers, or for any air carrier and any
other common carrier or any person engaged in any other phase
of aeronautics, to consolidate or merge their properties, or any part
thereof, into one person for the ownership, management, or opera-
tion of the properties theretofore in separate ownerships. [emphasis
added to proposed deletion].
Judge Seaver admits that this "would require Board approval of all air carrier
acquisitions," but does not feel that it would be "excessively burdensome." Initial
Decision at 180-81. It is not clear that such an amendment would have the de-
sired effect since a merger of properties "into one person" is not necessarily the
same thing as acquiring a subsidiary.
-249 U.S.C. § 1378(f) (1970). The text of subsection (f) appears in note 19
supra.
" These powers would include, inter alia, the power to require disclosures
under section 408(d), 49 U.S.C. S 1378(d). The text of subsection (d) appears
in note 19 supra.
4The CAB is reportedly attempting, however, to obtain more information
about the ownership of the parent companies. AIRLINE MANAGEMENT AND MAR-
KETING, May 1971, at 31.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970):
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confers antitrust immunity on persons affected by Board orders
made pursuant to specified provisions of the Act, including sec-
tion 408. Once the CAB approves a transaction under section 408,
section 414 exempts the parties to that transaction from the opera-
tion of the antitrust laws to the extent necessary to do anything
contemplated by the order granting approval. Since section 414
applies to all orders made under section 408, the breadth of the
Board's antitrust exemption power is therefore limited only by the
scope of section 408. If section 408 were read as giving the CAB
broad regulatory powers over all corporate affiliations of air car-
riers, the corresponding section 414 immunity could have sub-
stantial impact on the existing scheme of antitrust regulation out-
side the airline industry. It is unlikely, however, that the drafters
of the 1969 amendment to section 408 intended to expand the
scope of section 414 to confer antitrust immunity on any corpora-
tion which became affiliated with an air carrier in a transaction
subject to CAB approval. Since section 414 was intended only
to prevent destructive competition within the air transportation
industry, its extension to transactions involving members of other
industries as well as air carriers would seem to be unwarranted
absent a more explicit expression of congressional intent than an
amendment of a related section.
III. CAB REGULATION OF REORGANIZATIONS TO DATE
One frequent air carrier response to adverse financial condi-
tions has been the merger, a procedure justified primarily as an at-
tempt to increase the scope of operations and thereby increase mar-
ket share."' Since these transactions involve only air carriers, how-
ever, there has been no question of CAB regulatory power even
under section 408 prior to the 1969 amendment. The only issue in
air carrier mergers is the advisability of the merger itself; the CAB
has not had to consider, in this context, the weakening of air car-
riers by interests outside the aviation industry. Mergers are evaluat-
Any person affected by any order made under section 1378, 1379,
or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the opera-
tions of the "antitrust laws" as designated in section 12 of title 15,
and of all other restraints or prohibitions of . . . law, insofar as
may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized,
approved, or required by such order.
8 See note 3 supra.
1974]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ed largely on the basis of anticipated benefit or detriment to service
and competition within the industry,37 rather than potential inter-
ference from or with outside interests.
Another transaction clearly subject to CAB regulation, even
before the amendment of section 408, was acquisition of control
of air carriers or persons engaged in "any other phase of aeronau-
tics."3 While this type of arrangement is not necessarily a "reor-
ganization" of an air carrier, it resembles to a certain degree the
acquisition of an air carrier by a holding company. Possibly the
most celebrated case involving an acquisition of an air carrier by a
common carrier is Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. United
States,s" which involved the creation ("acquisition") by Pan Ameri-
can and W. R. Grace & Co."° of a jointly-owned subsidiary, Pan
American-Grace Airways (Panagra). In response to allegations that
non-competition agreements between Pan American and Panagra
violated the antitrust laws, the United States Supreme Court held
that primary jurisdiction over the issues raised by the complaint
was vested in the CAB by virtue of the Board's powers under sec-
tions 408 and 414 and ordered the complaint dismissed."' With re-
spect to persons "engaged in any other phase of aeronautics," an
illustrative example is the acquisition of control of Trans World
Airlines by Hughes Tool Company, over which the CAB exercised
considerable supervision. ' This degree of regulatory supervision
was approved by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Hughes
Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,' where the Court stated that
"the parent company which controls an air carrier is subject to per-
vasive control by the CAB.""
The transactions triggering the CAB's current concern, however,
have taken another form, known as the "holding-company" reor-
31 Cf. Crooker, supra note 3, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. at 154, 158-59.
" See note 19 supra.
39 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
4 0 W.R. Grace & Co. was a common carrier by water.
4'371 U.S. at 309, 313.
See, e.g., Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool
Company, 6 C.A.B. 153 (1944) (Transcontinental & Western was the predecessor
of TWA); Trans World Airlines, Inc., Further Control by Hughes Tool Com-
pany, 12 C.A.B. 192 (1950).
3409 U.S. 363 (1973).
44 Id. at 387.
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ganization. Under this arrangement, the air carrier itself creates a
holding company to acquire the air carrier by distributing the stock
of the holding company to the air carrier's stockholders in ex-
change for their stock interest in the air carrier. ' This type of trans-
action was utilized in the 1969 reorganization of United Air Lines
whereby United was acquired by UAL, Inc., a holding company
created for that purpose. The CAB, believing that section 408 as
then written did not give it power over this transaction, disclaimed
jurisdiction." Following the amendment of section 408 by Public
Law 91-62," however, the Board concluded that it had jurisdiction
over these transactions and exercised that jurisdiction by imposing
"fairly strict conditions" on similar reorganization plans of Flying
Tiger Lines and Airlift International."'
Braniff's application, " however, for permission to embark on a
similar plan of holding-company reorganization, brought about the
Reorganization Investigation." The CAB, now convinced that it
had jurisdiction, decided that the time had come to examine what
seemed to be developing as a clear trend toward air carrier diversi-
fication." The Board did not limit the scope of the inquiry to the
holding-company variant, but rather extended it to "all aspects of
diversification by any air carriers,""2 and to an inquiry into the need
for regulation and legislation with regard to these activities. The
Board's primary concern was diversification "from within," i.e.,
reorganizations instigated by air carriers themselves. These trans-
41 There are, of course, other variations of the transaction, but the net effect
is essentially the same. One goal in planning such a reorganization is to ensure
that it will be a "tax-free" reorganization under the federal tax laws, primarily
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 354, 361, 368.
41 CAB Order No. 69-4-67 (April 15, 1969).
"r See notes 11, 19 supra and accompanying text.
"Initial Decision at 2. See CAB Order No. 71-6-106 (June 21, 1971); CAB
Order No. 70-9-8 (July 15, 1970). The Airlift plan was later abandoned. See
note 18 supra. For extensive discussion of the United and Flying Tiger reorganiza-
tions, the proposed Braniff reorganization and other airline diversification in gen-
eral, see the Initial Decision at 24-72.
"CAB Docket No. 24048 (filed Dec. 8, 1971). Docket No. 24048 was con-
solidated for hearing with Docket Nos. 21508, 21223, and 24283. See note 8 supra.
"Initial Decision at 3; CAB Order No. 72-3-27 (March 10, 1972). Braniff's
application was severed and conditionally approved, pending final determination
of the Reorganization Investigation, in October, 1973. CAB Order No. 73-11-8
(Oct. 23, 1973).
51 CAB Order No. 72-3-27, at 4-5 (March 10, 1972).
" Initial Decision at 3.
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actions include: (i) the carrier-created holding company that
acquires the air carrier that created it, (ii) the divisive reorganiza-
tion whereby a single carrier is divided into two or more new
corporations and (iii) the acquisition of subsidiaries by an air
carrier that becomes the parent of a diversified group. The Board
also considered, however, the problems of continued supervision
of diversification "from without," i.e., when the carrier is acquired
as a subsidiary by a parent corporation not otherwise subject to
CAB regulation." This latter form of diversification is subject to
CAB approval regarding the acquisition itself, but the Board's
power to exert continuing supervision by conditioning its approval
is not as clear. Additionally, while amended section 408 requires
CAB approval for acquisition of a carrier, even by a holding com-
pany created by the carrier for that purpose, the statute does not
explicitly apply to other acquisitions either by air carriers as
parents or by holding companies with air carrier subsidiaries. One
of the purposes of the investigation was to determine which of
these variations were already subject to CAB approval and which,
if any, required additional legislation to ensure adequate regulation.
IV. THE AIR CARRIER REORGANIZATION INVESTIGATION
The Civil Aeronautics Board framed four broad issues to be
considered in the Reorganization Investigation:
(a) whether Braniff's application should be approved and if so
subject to what conditions;
(b) what further terms, conditions, or limitations should be
placed on the Board's approval of the Flying Tiger and Airlift re-
organizations, and as to Airlift whether the Board's approval should
be rescinded;
(c) what terms, conditions, or limitations, if any, is the Board
authorized to impose in respect to the relationship between United
Air Lines, Inc., on the one hand, and UAL, Inc., and any other
affiliates, on the other, and what terms, conditions, or limitations
which the Board is authorized to impose should be adopted;
(d) in addition to the Board's present powers as derived from
its regulations and the Federal Aviation Act, inter alia, what further
regulations and/or legislation would be necessary to deal effectively
with air carrier diversification."
11 CAB Order No. 72-3-27, at 4 (March 10, 1972).
4Id. at 5.
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In searching for the answers to these questions, Administrative
Law Judge E. Robert Seaver had to assess widely divergent view-
points on both the legal and economic aspects of air carrier
diversification. Whereas the airlines were almost unanimously opti-
mistic regarding the economic benefits to be derived from diversifi-
cation, the CAB was skeptical and even alarmed at the prospect
that uncontrolled diversification could cripple the air transporta-
tion industry by creating another economic tragedy like the Penn
Central collapse. There was a similar conflict concerning the ex-
tent of CAB regulatory power over these activities and the ad-
visability and necessity of its exercise. The parties also disagreed
concerning the antitrust problems which might arise through the
exercise of the Board's section 414 immunization power.
A. Positions of the Parties
1. The Air Carriers
United, Flying Tiger, Braniff and Airlift were made parties to
the investigation, although Airlift was subsequently dismissed."
Additionally, National Airlines was allowed to intervene, but par-
ticipated only to the extent of filing a statement of position." The
airlines were quite optimistic about the economic benefits to be
derived from diversification, in general, and indicated several ways
in which diversification could lead to increased carrier prosperity.
The most significant advantage seen by the airlines was the poten-
tial for "dampening" the cyclical nature of earnings in the air
transportation industry, thus providing increased financial stability
and an increased ability to provide adequate and efficient service.
According to United, the question was:
Whether certificated air carriers should be non-diversified, single-
minded companies whose performance is inexorably tied to the
peaks and valleys of the air transportation business . . . [or] be
allowed to be a part of larger, diversified entities."
mSee note 18 supra.
"Initial Decision at 3. National's statement of position indicated its agreement
with the position of the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights, discussed in Section
IV. World Airways, which also intervened, but later withdrew as an intervenor,
"presented testimony which supported . . . diversification either through the use
of subsidiaries . . . or by means of the formation of a holding company." Id. at
5-6.
.7 Id. at 132 (from testimony of expert witness Charles D. Barker).
1974]
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While diversification cannot completely eliminate economic ups
and downs, since "all business activities tend to follow the same
economic trends,"'" the potential offset between fluctuations in
different industries should have a salutary effect on the earnings
stability of a corporate family engaged in diversified activities."
Presumably, the effect of a "dampened" earnings cycle would be
to lower investor risk and therefore lower the cost of equity capital;
at the same time, resources of the entire corporate group would
be available to combat temporary reverses, eliminating the need
for short-term financing from outside sources."0 The air carriers
conceded, however, that diversification would not fundamentally
alter the economics of air transportation, but would merely render
the diversified group "less susceptible" to fluctuations in earnings. 1
Other advantages of diversification claimed by the air carriers
include economy of scale, leveling of labor costs and tax benefits.
With respect to labor costs, the airlines had seen their profits in-
creasingly reduced by the rising cost of labor. By combining a
carrier with a less labor-intensive business, the effect of high labor
costs would be leveled across the entire enterprise, while the high
profits of the affiliated corporation might be partially shielded by
the investment tax credit and net operating loss carryovers accumu-
lated by the airline."2 An additional advantage seen by the advo-
cates of the holding-company type of reorganization was the
potential for shielding non-air carrier subsidiaries from CAB inter-
ference. United and Flying Tiger both presented testimony that
their holding-company diversifications have permitted activities
that would have been impossible in an organization having an
air carrier as the parent. 3 This rationale is founded on the premise
that the CAB can exert considerable influence over the financial
activities of the subsidiaries by virtue of its clear jurisdiction over
the parent airline. When the parent is a holding company and the
air carrier merely one of many subsidiaries, however, the potential
for CAB influence is not as great.
5, Id. at 133.
59 Id.
00 Id.
61 Id. at 137.
"Id. at 134.
'
3 Id. at 135.
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Concerning the scope of CAB jurisdiction, the air carriers them-
selves were divided. Braniff conceded that the Board should exer-
cise reasonable regulation over air carrier diversification programs,
but Flying Tiger asserted that the Board had "neither the power
nor the expertise to regulate broadly all acquisitions by air car-
riers and their affiliates."" Furthermore, Flying Tiger was of the
opinion that most of the controls proposed by the CAB's Bureau
of Operating Rights exceeded the Board's statutory powers. United
took a middle position, asserting that the public interest would be
adequately protected by reasonable reporting requirements, with-
out any need for restrictive conditions on approval of proposed
reorganizations."
2. The Civil Aeronautics Board-Bureau of Operating Rights
The position of the CAB was represented by the Board's Bureau
of Operating Rights (BOR), which offered evidence on the merits
and also proposed a set of controlse to be placed on air carrier
diversification activities. While the Bureau ultimately took the posi-
tion that diversification should be permitted under an adequate
regulatory scheme, it felt that the evidence of the asserted benefits
of diversification was inconclusive and that the advantages were
in many ways offset by equally obvious disadvantages."8
On the merits of diversification, the Bureau argued that in the
reorganizations that had occured to date, there had been no notice-
able elimination of cyclical earnings, and that any benefits that
did occur accrued to the entire group of affiliated corporations and
not to the air carrier individually." The ultimate concern of the
BOR, and therefore of the CAB, is the financial stability and well-
being of the air carriers; benefits accruing to other members of a
corporate family are significant only insofar as they also contribute
4Id. at 18.
:5 Id. at 17.
6 Id. at 18. With respect to its own reorganization, however, United questioned
the power of the CAB to impose conditions at this stage since the United reor-
ganization was a fait accompli before the amendment of section 408. In addition,
the Board had expressly disclaimed jurisdiction. See CAB Order No. 69-4-67
(April 15, 1969).
'7 See Initial Decision at 8-10.
"Id. at 6-7, 138-41.
19Id. at 136, 138-41.
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to the health of the air carrier involved."' The Bureau also pointed
to several other potential disadvantages, like the siphoning-off of
carrier assets and profits and distraction of management from full
attention to air transportation activities.' Indeed, Judge Seaver
noted in his Initial Decision:
Even offsetting the fact that the hearing herein was directed to
diversification activities, the testimony of the principal officers of
the three carrier parties left the strong impression that much of
their time is now taken up with diversified business activities."'
Concerning asset and profit drain, the record indicated that Flying
Tiger and United had both been required to pay considerable
amounts to their parent holding companies,"' either as dividends
or in other ways. Additionally, the BOR emphasized that the
parent could further damage the air carrier subsidiary by denying
equity capital to the carrier in times of poor business conditions,
investing its available capital instead in other subsidiaries that were
currently showing a better return."
The CAB was also alarmed at the prospect that an air carrier
might suffer the same fate as the Penn Central railroad, sometimes
characterized as being a victim of excessive diversification. ' The
CAB did not take a position of opposition to mergers and acquisi-
tions per se, as CAB chairman, Timm has indicated:
What I am suggesting is that the airline industry should be afforded
the same economic tools that other mature industries have, includ-
ing a healthy and nondestructive competitive climate; responsible
mergers, acquisitions, and diversification.'
On the other hand, the order instituting the Reorganization In-
vestigation makes it clear that the Board is cognizant of "the in-
formation flowing from the various investigations of Penn Central's
70 Id.





"Cf. Reid & Mohrfeld, supra note 3, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. at 168: "The clas-
sic example in the transportation industry is the infamous Penn-Central merger
which has become the largest single economic failure in the history of business
and commercial affairs."
70 Statement of Chairman Robert D. Timm, supra note 1.
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many problems."" Although no attempt was made to probe deeply
into that matter, and Judge Seaver apparently concluded that the
Penn Central situation was not "sufficiently analogous to be of
direct assistance,"'" official notice" was taken of a report by the
special staff of the Senate Commerce Committee, which concluded
that the Penn Central collapse was not caused by diversification
per se, but, inter alia, by an "improvident divident policy" and
management problems." Profit drain, through payment of exces-
sive dividends, and management distraction and inefficiency are,
as previously mentioned, among the potential drawbacks of di-
versification seen by the CAB.
Concerning its authority over reorganizations, the Board asserted
that its regulatory power extends at least to the holding-company
form of reorganization under amended section 408." Judge Seaver
apparently concluded, however, that legislation was needed to give
the CAB direct jurisdiction over acquisitions of subsidiaries by
an air carrier parent." He dismissed as without support in the
legislative record a contention by Flying Tiger that the amend-
ment to section 408 only covered acquisition of an air carrier
from without,"3 stating that the phrase "any other person" as used
in section 408 (a) (5) "manifestly includes the acquisition by a
holding company formed by the carrier."" The gaps in CAB
authority under current law, therefore, would leave the Board
without direct control over two types of acquisitions: (i) those in
which an air carrier acquires subsidiaries, and (ii) those in which
a holding company owning an air carrier subsidiary acquires other
"CAB Order No. 72-3-27, at 4 (March 10, 1972). The Board noted that
approval of the Flying Tiger and Airlift reorganizations was granted shortly be-
fore Penn Central went into bankruptcy reorganization.
"Initial Decision at 95.
"Id. n.23.
"See SPECIAL STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., THE PENN CENTRAL AND OTHER RAILROADS (1972). Cf. STAFF REPORT
OF THE SEC TO THE HOUSE SPECIAL SUBCOM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN-CENTRAL COMPANY (1972). The
Bureau of Operating Rights introduced in evidence a number of other documents
concerning diversification in regulated industries. A list of these documents ap-
pears in the Initial Decision at 79-80.
"See CAB Order No. 72-3-17, at 3 (March 10, 1973).
'Initial Decision at 180-81.
81Id. at 150-51.
84 Id. at 151.
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subsidiaries.' Whatever control the CAB could exert in these situa-
tions would be indirect, by virtue of its jurisdiction over the air
carrier itself; presumably, the Board's leverage would be consider-
ably greater in the former instance than in the latter. If the CAB
adopted a "bilateral" reading of "any other person" in section
408 (a) (5),'" it could then reach the first transaction, though not
the second. This bilateral reading of "any other person" would
certainly be quickly challenged by those air carriers already con-
trolling subsidiaries." Concerning the holding-company approach,
it is not clear whether Congress, in enacting the 1969 amendment
to section 408, intended only to reach the initial acquisition, or to
give the CAB further authority over those subsequent acquisitions
by the same parent which might affect the carrier, albeit indirectly.
It is at least arguable that the kind of regulation contemplated by
Congress to protect the airline industry would require a continuing
jurisdiction by the CAB. This concept was suggested in the House
debate on the amendment to section 408:
The question is, do we want people going in on regulated industries
who are going to have interests other than the interests of providing
the kinds of service the regulated industry is going to provide? The
answer is "No." Then the question is, how do we devolve a mecha-
nism for preventing these kinds of circumstances from taking place?
The answer is very simple. We have given the regulatory agency
concerned a specific statutory direction to direct itself to this point
and to see to it that these regulated industries not only function in
the public interest but also that they are manned by boards of di-
rectors and by control which will assure that fact.8
Since Congress did not expressly make these transactions subject
to CAB control, however, presumably any attempt by the Board
85 This assumes that the acquired subsidiary is neither an air carrier nor en-
gaged in another phase of aeronautics. The acquisition of an air carrier is the
section 408(a)(5) situation; the acquisition of a person engaged in another phase
of aeronautics is covered by section 408(a)(6), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(6) (1970)
which makes it unlawful unless approved by the Board:
For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to acquire
control, in any manner whatsoever, of any person engaged in any
phase of aeronautics otherwise than as an air carrier . . . [emphasis
added].
8 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
87 A partial list of air carrier-subsidiary control relationships of this type is
contained in the Initial Decision at 70-71.
,1 115 CONG. REC. 6042 (1969) (remarks of Congressman Dingell).
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to assert jurisdiction over them would be strongly contested by
the air carriers and other interested parties.89 Whether further legis-
lation will be forthcoming is uncertain; congressional response to
this particular "loophole" may depend largely upon the perform-
ance of diversified carriers and CAB reaction.9°
3. Other Parties
The Departments of Justice (Antitrust Division) and Trans-
portation (DOT) were also parties to the Reorganization Investiga-
tion. The Justice Department took no firm position on the advisa-
bility of diversification itself, but agreed that both the advantages
and disadvantages were real."' On the regulatory issues, however,
the Antitrust Division did express an opinion concerning the anti-
trust aspects, and suggested a regulatory approach that the CAB
might adopt.' The Department of Transportation, while caution-
ing of serious problems that might result from financial manipula-
tion, conceded that diversification might prove beneficial if properly
regulated. The DOT also proposed a regulatory scheme. 3
11 Cf. Rasenberger, supra note 26, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. at 81-82.
"That the trend may be toward increasingly close scrutiny, and possibly more
comprehensive regulation, of diversification of transportation companies in gen-
eral is suggested in the SEC study mentioned supra note 80, Foreword at IV:
Transportation carriers in their function as utilities operating
under a public license are in a position to monopolize a segment of
the national economy and thereby ensure a guaranteed source of
funds. Diversion of those guaranteed funds out of the transportation
business and into other endeavors offering a more attractive invest-
ment return is increasing ....
One motor carrier . . . exceeded its standard for an acceptable
working capital ratio and unreasonably mortgaged [its] operating
equipment. The experience of the Penn Central with diversification
profits on acquired . . . operations are often illusory while the
out-of-pocket costs. . . . are quite real. In the same vein the increas-
ing diversification by air carriers may result in unreasonably encum-
bering airline operating equipment while the costs of acquisition ex-
ceed the real benefits thereof.
The record is not clear that diversification is absolutely bad ....
Until a thorough analysis is made of the public interest benefits for
diversification... a proper conclusion may not be reached. In order
to make this analysis, . . . the staff of the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations [has been instructed] to collect and study all the avail-
able data on diversified transportation companies. ...
One solution considered in the study was federal incorporation of companies regu-
lated by the ICC and the CAB.
"Initial Decision at 10-11.
Id. at 12.
93 Id. at 13-15.
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B. The Proposed System of Regulation
Administrative Law Judge Seaver was persuaded that diversifica-
tion was not so inherently hazardous that it should be prohibited
to air carriers." He was convinced, however, that there was suffi-
cient danger of abuse that the CAB should undertake a relatively
strict program of regulation of air carrier diversification of what-
ever type, although the holding-company pattern was considered to
be more fraught with peril than the air carrier-parent arrange-
ment.' According to Judge Seaver, the primary concern of the
CAB is the well-being of the air carrier itself and its ability to pro-
vide adequate service, and other factors are of only secondary im-
portance. Any benefit conferred on a non-air carrier member of a
diversified group is immaterial unless the air carrier is helped, di-
rectly or indirectly, as well.9" Furthermore, no arrangement should
be allowed that might work to the detriment of an air carrier. Judge
Seaver concluded that the CAB had the power to regulate such
activities."7 He recommended, however, additional legislation to
close the existing gaps in the Board's authority." The CAB's power,
as Judge Seaver saw it, is not limited to approval or disapproval
of the initial acquisition, but is sufficient to reach other activities
by the conglomerate which might affect the air carrier;"9 Congress
surely did not intend to limit the Board's power in this area, but
"must have intended to give it authority that was ample to deal
with the evil at hand."'
The regulatory scheme proposed by Judge Seaver..' consists of
three basic measures. ' First, intercompany transactions between a
94 Id. at 218.
I d.
99 Id. at 128-29.
I d. at 150-67.
9 See notes 30, 31 supra and accompanying text.
9 Initial Decision at 150-67, citing Foreign Study League v. CAB, 475 F.2d
865 (10th Cir. 1973); Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S.
296 (1963). See also Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363
(1973).
10 Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 (1963).
See Initial Decision at 164.
10 The proposed controls are based primarily on those suggested by the Bu-
reau of Operating Rights. Initial Decision at 197.
102 The proposed regulations and guidelines are fully described in the Initial
Decision, at 184-207 and Appendix H.
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carrier" and its affiliates would be limited to those described in
"transaction agreements" drafted under guidelines established by
the CAB. The transaction agreements would be subject to the prior
approval of the Board."' Secondly, quarterly reports would be re-
quired, describing transactions in the quarter just completed, to
enable the Board to assess compliance with the transaction agree-
ments. Thirdly, "performance monitoring reports" would be sub-
mitted to the CAB for continuous monitoring of the effects of di-
versification on the air carrier," resulting from the reported trans-
actions. The transactions to be described in the transaction agree-
ments and reported quarterly would include:"' dividends,"" inter-
company management services, joint use of employee time, joint
marketing, transfers of goods and services, joint purchasing or
leasing, intercompany loans and advances, 08 intercompany trans-
fers of assets other than funds,' leases of property and equipment,
joint use of assets and facilities, tax allocations,"' tour packages
with affiliated hotels, and guarantees, pledges, and other credit
support.
The air carriers expressed general acquiescence11 to these pro-
posed regulations, but raised two specific objections. First, they in-
" The regulatory plan would only apply to scheduled carriers, at least at first,
since the public interest "would not be affected as adversely and immediately" if
other elements of the air transportation industry suffered ill effects as a result of
diversification. Initial Decision at 212.
"' The Transaction Agreements could be amended at any time, whereupon
the Board could modify or withdraw its approval. Id. at 198.
11 Factors to be monitored would include relative size of the air carrier in
comparison to its affiliates, current status of debt restrictions, intercompany dis-
tribution of funds, and type and extent of non-air-transportation business carried
on by the corporate group. Id. at 199-203.
"Id. at 197, Appendix H at 1-11.
107 Guidelines: Cash dividends paid on common stock could be paid only out
of unappropriated earned surplus plus current net income, not to exceed 50%
of previous year's net income. Initial Decision, Appendix H at 2.
1"I Guidelines: Interest charges would be limited to interest rates available in
arm's-length transactions with outsiders. Interest at a floating prime rate would be
prima facie evidence that this standard had been met. Id. at 6.
10 Guidelines: All such transfers should be at fair market value, except that
transfers to air carriers could be at less than FMV. Id. at 8.
110Guidelines: The air carrier would be entitled to receive the full benefit of
tax credits generated by it when used by the holding company, without regard to
whether or not the airline could later use the credit if filing a separate return. Id.
at 9.
... Initial Decision at 186.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sisted that CAB approval of the transaction agreements was unnec-
essary and that mere reporting requirements would suffice.11 ' Judge
Seaver rejected this contention, expressing the opinion that if car-
riers' and affiliates' goodwill could be relied on, regulation would
never be necessary."' Secondly, objections were raised to the divi-
dend restrictions. Judge Seaver, however, responded that fairly
stringent restrictions were essential to prevent depletion of working
capital through payment of excessive dividends.'
The proposed controls, even though somewhat strict, seem rea-
sonably well adapted to serve the intended purpose. Nevertheless,
criticisms of the CAB plan are justified. The requirement of CAB
approval could easily result in a situation wherein management will
be forced to tailor its action to what is perceived to be the Board's
preference; the alternatives being either to take no action because
other options appeared unlikely to receive CAB approval, or to
transact with an outsider so that no approval would be required,
which would defeat the purpose of diversification. The possibility of
effectively substituting CAB judgement for that of management
should be resolutely guarded against"' since the Board's familiarity
with the particular business exigencies necessitating one of the
regulated transactions would almost inevitably be less than that of
management. Additionally, since there has been so little experi-
ence with airline diversification, considerable flexibility of regula-
tion should be maintained so that proper adjustments can be made
as experience accrues and other variables become pertinent. Judge
Seaver indicated that the governing standard should be one of
fundamental fairness to the air carrier.'6 This standard is clearly
preferable to dollar or frequency limits.
V. ANTITRUST PROBLEMS
An additional problem, assuming the CAB adopts Judge Sea-
ver's proposed controls, is the extent to which the Board might by
exercise of its powers affect competitive patterns outside the air
transportation industry, either intentionally or inadvertently. Since
I Id.
11 Id.
114 Id. at 202.
11' Cf. Initial Decision at 190.
" Initial Decision, Appendix H at 12.
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section 41417 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 confers im-
munity from the antitrust laws to the extent necessary to comply
with an order made under section 408, presumably any transaction
approved by the Board in connection with an acquisition governed
by section 408 would not result in antitrust liability. The Justice
Department, articulating a principle which impliedly limits CAB
jurisdiction over all activities outside the air transportation industry,
asserted that the Board's statutory authority cannot extend to a
non-air carrier when antitrust matters are at issue simply because
the non-carrier and an air carrier are members of the same cor-
porate group."' The Justice Department contended that while
under the doctrine of Pan American World Airways v. United
States ... and Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, . . . the Board's eco-
nomic jurisdiction "extends beyond these areas specifically enumer-
ated in the Federal Aviation Act to include those activities and
relationships of an air carrier that directly affect its ability to pro-
vide air transportation" ... this jurisdiction does not extend to the
activities of air carriers or persons controlling air carriers which
are unrelated to air transportation or have "only an incidental
effect" on air transportation."'
The Department of Justice asserted that it and the Federal Trade
Commission have "primary responsibility" for antitrust matters out-
side the air transportation industry, and that the CAB cannot ac-
quire jurisdiction (to immunize, nor by implication, to regulate)
over "non-air lines of commerce simply because they are owned by a
holding company which also controls an airline.'.. ° Although Judge
Seaver conceded that there were numerous anticompetitive prob-
lems that arise in diversified businesses, such as reciprocal dealing
11749 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970). The text of this provision is set out in note 35
supra.
1"' Initial Decision at 10.
.. Id. at 11. See Pan American World Airways v. United States, 341 U.S. 296
(1963); Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S. 363 (1963). Cf. Breen Air Freight,
Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932
(1973), noted in 39 J. Air L. & Com. 453 (1973), where the Second Circuit held
that the Civil Aeronautics Board's power to immunize from antitrust liability was
limited by the statutory definition of "air carrier" in section 101(3) of the Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970). The court in Breen concluded that despite close
relationships to air carriers, persons outside the statutory definition could not be
immunized from antitrust liability by the CAB.
I" Initial Decision at 10.
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and vertical foreclosure of competing suppliers, 1' he rejected the
strict antitrust controls advocated by the Department of Justice.1"
Noting that diversification often results in pro-competitive effects,1 '"
Judge Seaver concluded that the Board's discretion and the avail-
ability of judicial review would be adequate to prevent interference
with established competitive patterns in other industries."
VI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN AIR CARRIER REORGANIZATIONS
Aside from certain difficulties introduced by the existence of
CAB regulation of air carriers, the reorganization of an air carrier,
by whatever method, does not present problems essentially different
from those incident to a similar transaction involving any other
corporation. Certain specific objectives, including the search for
profit centers that will offset the cyclical nature of airline revenues
and the need for new sources of financing, will inevitably play a
part in the selection and mode of acquisition or creation of sub-
sidiaries and affiliates. Similar objectives are applicable to most
industries, however, as are antitrust considerations and the neces-
sity of fashioning the particular transaction to derive maximum
benefit from the applicable federal tax laws.'' The juxtaposition of
these general objectives with the CAB's regulatory interests and
policies can cause certain problems that would not ordinarily ac-
company a reorganization in a non-regulated industry.
The consequences of CAB regulation are quite apparent in the
area of allocation of tax benefits. For example, an obvious tax
advantage of a diversified corporate family is the filing of a con-
solidated income tax return." ' This procedure would permit, inter
alia, the losses generated by one entity to be offset against the
profits of another, a consequence clearly desirable when an ob-
jective is to dampen the cyclical profit-and-loss patterns of indi-
121 Id. at 170.
2 Id. at 175-77.
"'I d. at 173-74.
124 Id. at 178-80.
12I The applicable federal tax laws are among the most complicated provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 38, 46-50 (relating
to the investment credit); §§ 351-68 (relating to corporate organizations and re-
organizations); §§ 381-83 (carryovers); §§ 1501-05, 1551-52, 1561-64 (consol-
idated returns).
'
2' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1501-05, 1551-52, 1561-64.
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vidual members of the group. Additionally, the consolidated return
permits certain otherwise unusable tax credits, loss carryovers and
deductions attributable to one corporation to inure to the benefit
of the other corporations that compose the diversified family."'
Normally, the allocation of the benefits thus derived would be a
matter of contract or agreement among the parties. Judge Seaver's
proposed guidelines, however, would require that the air carrier
member of an affiliated group receive the entire benefit of a tax
credit generated by it whether or not the credit would later benefit
the carrier if it were filing a separate return." This arrangment is,
of course, not inherently unreasonable, but neither is it totally
realistic in terms of the myriad possibilities for other allocations
within good business judgment not necessarily prejudical to the
air carrier. This requirement, while consonant with a policy en-
gendering the fiscal stability of air carriers, could in practice
operate as an arbitrary restriction on the ability of the corporate
group to allocate available funds among its members as dictated
by business exigencies and thereby serve to dilute the benefit of
filing the consolidated return. Similar restrictions have been ap-
plied to intercorporate tax benefit allocations among the members
of the Flying Tiger group, but their effect is not yet apparent.'21
Another area of uncertainty traceable to CAB influence, pend-
ing the outcome of the Reorganization Investigation, is the pros-
pect of forced divestiture if the Board ultimately determines that
certain types of air carrier reorganization are not in the public
interest. In approving the Braniff reorganization,"' the Board em-
phasized that it was granting only interim approval, and ordered
Braniff to be prepared to "readily return to a non-holding com-
pany form of structure" until final resolution of the issues in the
Reorganization Investigation."' A similar condition was annexed
to CAB approval of certain of Flying Tiger's financial arrange-
ments with subsidiaries; this condition would not necessarily re-
quire anything as drastic as divestiture, but could require Flying
...INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 38, 46-50, 381-83.
"'Initial Decision, Appendix H at 9. See note 110 supra.
19 See CAB Order No. 73-12-105 (Dec. 26, 1973); CAB Order No. 73-12-106
(Dec. 26, 1973).
0 CAB Order No. 73-11-8 (Oct. 23, 1973). See note 50 supra.
"I CAB Order No. 73-11-8 (Oct. 23, 1973).
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Tiger to "undo" certain financial arrangements." ' While the CAB
advances what it considers good policy reasons for these condi-
tions,' " the hardship thus imposed on those responsible for con-
ducting corporate affairs is apparent. The prospects of operating
a diversified corporate enterprise under a threat of forced divesti-
ture are not encouraging and must inevitably have the effect of
discouraging certain transactions, particularly those involving long-
term financing. Obviously, a parent would be reluctant to guarantee
the long-term obligations of a subsidiary that might be stripped
from it at any moment; nor would the parent corporation be will-
ing to commit its own funds in this atmosphere of uncertainty. On
the other hand, any advances from the subsidiary to the parent, or
payment of a large dividend, might be considered a "raid" if
divestiture were ordered and repayment compelled even if initially
motivated by good business reasons. Admittedly, the threat of
forced divestiture under the antitrust laws is present, at least the-
oretically, in any acquisition. The operation of the antitrust laws,
however, is somewhat predictable, whereas the standards to be
applied by the CAB are as yet unsettled. Until the Board prescribes
ascertainable standards, there will inevitably be some hesitation on
the part of the air carriers to enter into transactions that might
result in a later order of divestiture. This temporary uncertainty
might be tolerable if there were any assurance that the CAB would
refrain from conditioning its approval of each transaction. There
is, however, no guarantee that the Board will not reserve the right
in every instance to order divestiture if it subsequently determines
that the transaction was unwise. If the Board continues to take
this approach, the result may be to discourage diversification in-
volving air carriers except at times when the carriers are financially
solvent and not in need of infusions of capital from other sources,
but to discourage diversification, because of the threat of divesti-
"
32CAB Order No. 73-12-105 (Dec. 26, 1973); CAB Order No. 73-12-106
(Dec. 26, 1973).
133 The Board felt that it would be unfair to delay ultimate decision on these
matters until it handed down its final decision in the Reorganization Investigation,
but emphasized that it could only grant approval conditionally since the transac-
tions it currently approves may be disapproved later in the final determination of
the issues in the Investigation. CAB Order No. 73-11-8 (Oct. 23, 1973). Presum-
ably the Board felt that it did not yet have enough information to make a decision
on the broader issues, but the result of its conditional approval may be to impose
a greater hardship than if decision on Braniff's application had been postponed.
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ture, when the airlines are most in need of long-term financing.
The CAB could order divestiture, for example, at the point when
the carrier became profitable once more, reasoning that other
members of the group were siphoning off its profits. Parties con-
templating diversification transactions involving an air carrier are
well advised therefore to proceed with some caution at present.
There are other restrictions contained in Judge Seaver's guide-
lines that create pitfalls for the unwary. These, however, are of
a more speculative nature. For example, the guideline concerning
intercorporate transfers would require that transfers from an air
carrier be at fair market value or greater, while tansfers to an air
carrier might be at less than fair market value.' While this pro-
vision seems unduly slanted in favor of the air carrier, it may not
prove too great a problem even if adopted by the Board since these
transactions have tax consequences in many instances that nullify
the benefit of the bargain price and are therefore avoided any-
way. " A more subtle problem is involved in the provision restrict-
ing interest charges to air carriers to the maximum rate obtainable
by arms-length bargaining.3 ' This requirement, though objectively
fair, could cause difficulty if CAB notions of an equitable interest
rate did not coincide with those of the parties involved. The restric-
tion is eased somewhat by a recommendation that a floating prime
rate will be prima facie evidence of compliance." '
These are, of course, just a few of the many intricacies that may
be introduced into an already complicated area of the law, that of
corporate reorganizations and corporate taxation, if extensive CAB
regulation is overlaid onto the existing statutory scheme. Corporate
counsel and tax advisers will conceivably be required to master a
multitude of regulations and principles applicable only to trans-
actions involving air carriers and which will entail restrictions on
I" Initial Decision, Appendix H at 8. See note 109 supra.
'"5 Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 482.
Initial Decision, Appendix H at 6. See note 108 supra.
"3 Id. This is an example also of a more general problem. The CAB's exper-
tise in regulating, or prescribing guidelines for, such intercorporate transactions
may or may not be adequate. But even assuming that the CAB is competent to
prescribe such guidelines, its regulations may be so slanted in favor of the air
carriers, if Judge Seaver's opinion is any indication, as to preclude many transac-
tions which would otherwise be sound and accepted practice. The result would
be, in some cases, to substitute the Board's judgment for that of experienced cor-
porate executives who are more familiar with the needs of the business.
1974]
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corporate action not consonant with ordinary notions of good
business judgment absent a need for protection, imposed by CAB
regulatory policy, of one member of an affiliated group. Until the
Board issues a definitive statement concerning its intentions in this
area, a certain degree of caution is essential.
VII. CONCLUSION
The airline industry has in fact had more experience with diversi-
fied business activity than the preceding discussion may indicate.
A number of local service and supplemental carriers have been
operated for some time as subsidiaries of companies engaged to
a greater or lesser degree in activities unrelated to air transport.'
Additionally, many carriers, including several of the large trunk
carriers, have subsidiaries in both related and unrelated indus-
tries.'8 ' Most of these arrangements, however, either arose prior to
the amendment of section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act, or, to
the extent that they were subject to CAB regulation, were not of
sufficient impact to warrant the degree of concern that triggered
the Air Carrier Reorganization Investigation."' More recently, how-
ever, the applications of industry giants like Braniff for permission
to reorganize have indicated that despite problems of diversified
companies in other industries, the certificated air carriers have
perceived that one remedy for the financial problems of the air
transportation industry may be vertical reorganization, through
creation of subsidiaries and holding companies, rather than hori-
zontal reorganization, or merger, which has met with indifferent
success.'' Diversification has been successful in many instances
and many airlines are apparently eager to experiment with this
device. Unless the CAB adopts a more flexible regulatory approach,
however, it is likely that many of the benefits of diversification will
be denied to the air transportation industry.
Although the Board's concern for air carrier stability is legitimate
and probably justified by the potential for abuse of diversified cor-
" Initial Decision at 66-72.
' Id. at 70-71.
'
4
'But see Foreign Study League v. C.A.B., 475 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1973);
CAB Order No. 71-7-119 (July 21, 1971) (affirmed in Foreign Study League v.
C.A.B.).
"", See note 3 supra.
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porate structures, the projected plan of regulation is too restrictive.
Many of the guidelines proposed by the Bureau of Operating Rights
could in practice virtually preclude any exercise of independent
business judgment in transactions subject to Board approval. Al-
though the CAB clearly will have a regulatory interest in many
intercorporate transactions to which an air carrier is a party, this
interest is adequately served by existing regulatory mechanisms.
The economic balance between air carrier and non-air carrier mem-
bers of diversified groups does not require closer supervision than
is already provided under the tax laws since many of the transac-
tions that would be prohibited or discouraged under the proposed
regulatory scheme have tax consequences which are generally suffi-
cient to prevent their occurrence. Antitrust regulation by the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission is adequate, and
the public interest in free competition would not be served by ex-
panding CAB power to confer antitrust immunity. Furthermore,
many of the dangers sought to be avoided by the proposed plan
may be more apparent than real; the mere possibility of their
occurrence does not justify such stringent regulation.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has ample power under section
408 to approve or disapprove acquisitions of control of air carriers.
The Board's authority to condition its approval should be adequate
to insure continuing supervision in those rare instances when it
is warranted. Additionally, the Board's regulatory power over the
air carriers themselves is sufficient to provide indirect control over
relationships with subsidiaries that might weaken the parent air
carrier. The possibility that excessive diversification contributed to
the Penn Central collapse has not been sufficiently substantiated to
justify restrictive CAB regulation or new legislation that would
expand the Board's already considerable powers, especially since
the result might be to discourage utilization of apparently valuable
economic tools by the air carriers.
The Initial Decision is now before the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The Board may decide that further legislation is needed and make
an appropriate request to the Congress. It is more likely, however,
that the CAB will conclude that it has the power to regulate air
carrier diversification and will proceed to do so, either according
to Judge Seaver's proposals or, hopefully, by some less stringent
scheme of its own. The economic questions are largely a matter of
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time and experience; the regulatory issues and the scope of CAB
power may ultimately be decided in the courts, perhaps in the con-
text of air carrier defiance of CAB regulation. Whatever the out-
come, the Civil Aeronautics Board has been presented with a real
challenge to its ingenuity and regulatory expertise; its reaction may
well have profound influence on the economics of the air trans-
portation industry.
